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1 
Living Originalism in India? “Our Law” 
and Comparative Constitutional Law 
Sujit Choudhry* 
I. LIVING ORIGINALISM AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TWO 
QUESTIONS 
Living Originalism1 is about American constitutional practice. But it 
raises two sets of interesting questions for scholars of comparative 
constitutional law. 
First, Balkin is largely silent on the role of comparative materials in 
living originalism. But the negative implication from his understanding of 
constitutions is that comparative materials are irrelevant to constitutional 
construction. One of the central ideas in Living Originalism is the notion 
that the Constitution is “our law,” because the American people “identify 
with it and are attached to it.”2 The notion of the Constitution as “our law” 
has embedded within a conception of an intergenerational “collective 
subject”—We the People—“with a collective destiny that engages in 
collective activities,” which include the construction of the Constitution 
itself.3 And so living originalism means that “we understand our present 
situation and the possibilities and needs of the future through the 
trajectory of our interpretation of the meaning of the past—both the 
principles we committed ourselves to achieving and the evils we promised 
we would not permit again.”4 Constitutional construction is an internally 
and historically oriented process that draws upon local sources that are 
situated or particular to American constitutional culture, and seeks to 
reinterpret and adapt them in light of contemporary circumstances. 
Comparative materials have no place within this argumentative matrix. So 
 
* Cecelia Goetz Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Center for Constitutional Transitions, 
New York University School of Law. I thank Jack Balkin for his kind invitation to speak at the 
conference on Living Originalism, the editors of the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities for 
organizing this book symposium and for their skillful editing, Ira Parghi for helpful comments, and 
Aqeel Noorali for superb research assistance. 
1. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
2. Id. at 60. 
3. Id. at 61. 
4. Id. at 63. 
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here is my first question: Is it possible to reinterpret living originalism in a 
way that renders it comparatively engaged while still acknowledging the 
distinctiveness of the American constitutional identity? Indeed, can a 
comparatively inflected living originalism actually sharpen an awareness 
of national constitutional difference? 
Second, Balkin is self-consciously writing for an American audience 
about the nature of American constitutional practice. He presents living 
originalism, fidelity, text and principle, original meaning and original 
expected application, and constitutional construction as indigenous 
constitutional concepts, in a manner that is deeply reminiscent of Bruce 
Ackerman‟s call to reject foreign constitutional frameworks in We the 
People.5 But, of course, the issues that Balkin grapples with are not 
peculiarly American. It is entirely possible that his conceptual tools might 
have some analytic purchase outside the United States. Indeed, in a 
footnote Balkin opens the door to this possibility, even while he denies it.6 
Balkin doubts the comparative relevance of his argument, by underlining 
that Living Originalism is directed at “the American constitutional 
tradition and may not be readily generalizable to the constitutions of other 
countries.”7 The reason is that a contingent combination of factors gives 
rise to American constitutional culture, and he suggests it is unlikely that 
these factors are found in other constitutional systems. For example, 
Balkin draws a link between the sociological legitimacy of the American 
Constitution to “an imagined transgenerational project of constitutional 
politics,” and opines that “[i]n many cases, a country may play only a 
minor role in the construction of a national identity.”8 Likewise, he 
contrasts how America‟s Constitution “emerged from a revolutionary 
tradition” with how other “constitutions developed through longer, more 
gradual, and relatively peaceful transitions from colonial status.”9 But, of 
course, these are contingent points of contrast that are not necessarily true 
in every case, and represent differences more in degree than in kind. The 
American case may be distinctive, but is not utterly unique. This 
possibility gives rise to my second set of questions: Does Balkin‟s 
account of the phenomenology of constitutional argument have purchase 
outside the American constitutional tradition? If so, what can we learn by 
exploring the culture of constitutional argument in these foreign 
constitutional cultures? 
I want to offer an integrated answer to these two questions. One can 
 
5. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3 (1991). 
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imagine a different constitutional world from the United States in which 
something akin to living originalism is married to deep comparative 
constitutional reasoning. We can find that example in the constitutional 
discourse of the world‟s other great common law, federal, postcolonial 
liberal democracy: India. In the Indian constitutional imagination, the 
Constitution marks a decisive and sharp break with the past and was a 
central element in the formation of the Indian polity. To this day, the 
Indian Constitution remains a site of organic self-understanding and 
provides a platform for politics. Indian constitutional argument routinely 
reaches back to the founding premises of the constitutional order to apply 
it to contemporary circumstances. But it is nonetheless comparatively 
inflected. A careful reading of a couple of leading Indian examples 
illustrates a comparatively inflected living originalism in practice that not 
only acknowledges but also affirms a distinct constitutional identity—
either by sharpening moments of constitutional difference or by 
highlighting an (arguably contingent) overlap of shared constitutional 
premises. This interpretive method is what I term the dialogical model of 
comparative constitutional reasoning. I want to conclude by suggesting 
how the dialogical model offers a framework for harnessing comparative 
materials in the service of a living originalism that can enrich the kind of 
internally oriented constitutional conservation that Balkin advocates. I 
illustrate how this can be done in practice by offering an alternative basis 
for Justice O‟Connor‟s concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas,10 in a manner 
that Balkin would likely endorse. 
II. WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARATIVISM? 
Let me first explain what I mean by constitutional comparativism. Why, 
under what circumstances, and how should comparative constitutional 
materials figure into a national constitutional practice? More specifically, 
what role should they play in constitutional interpretation? In the United 
States, this question has spawned a debate that remains surprisingly 
polarized. It has become yet another issue that divides conservatives and 
liberals. The two poles of this debate are what I term constitutional 
nationalism and constitutional cosmopolitanism. 
On the nationalist conception, the use of comparative materials in 
constitutional interpretation stands at odds with one of the dominant 
understandings of constitutionalism—that the constitution of a nation 
emerges from, embodies, and aspires to sustain or respond to that nation‟s 
particular circumstances, most centrally to its history and political culture. 
As Jürgen Habermas has explained, the citizens of a nation often use 
 
10.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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constitutional discourse as a means to “clarify the way they want to 
understand themselves as citizens of a specific republic, as inhabitants of 
a specific region, as heirs to a specific culture, which traditions they want 
to perpetuate and which they want to discontinue, [and] how they want to 
deal with their history.”11 Indeed, for countries with a diverse citizenry 
that lack a prior or prepolitical bond of ethnicity, religion, or race, 
constitutions are an integral component of national identity and reflect 
one way in which those nations view themselves as different from others. 
It is fair to say that constitutions continue to be widely understood in this 
particular and local way. Although conservatives have tended to be 
constitutional nationalists, and liberals constitutional cosmopolitans, this 
need not be the case. Indeed, I think something like the nationalist view 
could be attributed to Balkin. 
The nationalist conception of the nature and character of constitutions 
has implications for how those documents should be interpreted and for 
the use of comparative constitutional materials as interpretive aids. On the 
nationalist view, constitutional interpretation should rely exclusively on 
sources internal to specific political and legal systems. These sources may 
vary and include original intent, text, structure, and a nation‟s political 
traditions and values. The use of local and particular sources in 
constitutional reasoning secures the legitimacy of judicial review. 
Comparative materials, by contrast, are of no assistance at all, precisely 
because they come from outside a given legal system. At best, they 
represent a foreign curiosity of strictly academic interest and little 
practical relevance. At worst, their use is a foreign imposition or even a 
form of legal imperialism. 
One possible challenge to this position is the increased convergence of 
constitutional texts, and specifically, bills of rights. In particular, there is a 
core set of rights—for example, the right to life and the right to equality—
that are found in most bills of rights. Moreover, the precise language of 
the provisions that entrench these rights is often very similar, reflecting 
the fact that the process of constitution drafting is deeply comparative and 
draws on common models. In the face of this textual similarity, the 
nationalist assertion of constitutional difference may be hard to sustain. 
However, committed nationalists emphasize differences where there 
appear to be none. On their account, these similarities are rather 
superficial, and conceal profound differences not apparent at first glance. 
Nationalists argue that it is beyond dispute that legal texts are inherently 
ambiguous and require reference to extratextual sources for their 
 
11. Jürgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in 
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 107, 125 (Amy Guttmann ed., 
1994). 
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interpretation and application in concrete cases. Moreover, although 
overarching principles of political morality provide some assistance, these 
arguments quickly run out, because the question then arises of which 
political morality to choose. For example, in choosing the appropriate 
background principle against which to interpret a constitutional right to 
equality—found in many contemporary bills of rights—libertarian and 
egalitarian theories of justice would counsel divergent interpretations of 
the scope of the provision in the context of challenges to reservations or 
affirmative action. Nationalists claim that courts, as a matter of empirical 
fact, do not look outward to foreign experiences to facilitate the choice 
among these different theories; rather, they turn inward by reference to 
sources internal to a nation‟s history and political traditions. 
At the opposite end from nationalists are cosmopolitans, who posit that 
constitutional guarantees are cut from a universal cloth, and that all 
constitutional courts are engaged in the identification, interpretation, and 
application of the same set of principles. Unlike nationalists, who 
emphasize the differences among constitutional systems, these scholars 
see unity in the midst of diversity. This mode of comparative 
constitutional interpretation exhorts courts to pay no heed to national 
constitutional particularities when engaging in constitutional 
interpretation. Courts should regard themselves as interpreting 
constitutional texts that protect rights that transcend national boundaries. 
The legitimacy of the reliance on comparative materials is buttressed by 
the empirical fact of convergence across constitutional systems. An 
emerging consensus among constitutional systems is proof of a particular 
constitutional interpretation‟s truth or rightness. The implicit image here 
is that of an international community of states and citizens that share a 
basic commitment to a vision of constitutionalism based on the rule of 
law and the rights of individuals. 
In concrete legal terms, constitutional cosmopolitans may focus on both 
the interpretation of rights and their limitation. With respect to the former, 
they would hold that particular rights—such as freedom of expression, 
freedom of religion, or freedom of association—could each be based on 
political theories of what interests those rights are designed to protect. 
Cosmopolitans argue that these theories are the same for every 
constitution in which those rights are found. These theories flow from 
liberal political morality, which entails that respect for rights is a 
condition for the legitimate exercise of public power. Comparative 
jurisprudence becomes a repository of principles to be relied on as 
valuable articulations, explanations, and commentaries on the political 
theories underlying particular constitutional rights. Additionally, foreign 
judgments suggest how those rights are to be implemented through the 
crafting of constitutional doctrine, and then applied in concrete cases. A 
5
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court no longer has to engage in the burdensome and time-consuming task 
of formulating the theories underlying particular rights, operationalizing 
those abstract guarantees through constitutional doctrine, or even applying 
those rights with respect to specific issues, since comparative case law 
offers a convenient shortcut to attaining these goals. 
A parallel logic applies to the question of justifiable limitations. It is a 
common feature of contemporary constitutional adjudication that rights 
are not absolute. Constitutional rights may be limited, but those 
limitations must meet a test of justification. An emerging model for 
framing the judicial inquiry into justifiable limits on constitutional rights 
is provided by the doctrine of proportionality. According to this doctrine, 
rights can be justifiably limited if a number of criteria are met. The 
limitation must be undertaken for a sufficiently important reason. The 
means chosen to vindicate this objective must actually achieve the 
objective. There must be no other means available that are equally 
effective in pursuing the objective and impairing the right less than the 
means chosen. The salutary effects of the rights-infringing measure 
outweigh the deleterious effects on the right. On the cosmopolitan 
account, this common template is integral to rights-based adjudication. 
How one court conceptualizes the notion of proportionality itself, frames 
the specific legal test that implements it, and applies it in specific cases 
should guide other courts because they are engaged in a common 
enterprise. 
The American debate over comparative constitutional law, which ebbs 
and flows, remains intense. Nationalists (who tend to be conservatives) 
accuse cosmopolitans (who tend to be liberals) of promoting a project of 
constitutional convergence that undermines American sovereignty. More 
coherently, they accuse cosmopolitans of failing to take seriously the 
notion that the Constitution is “our Constitution.” Cosmopolitans fuel 
both sets of criticisms by viewing comparative constitutional reasoning as 
a way of affirming America‟s membership in the community of liberal 
democracies in a variety of specific contexts: the death penalty, gay 
rights, and counter-terrorism. 
This debate has become deadlocked, futile, and sterile—which may 
explain Balkin‟s decision to ignore it. But it also bears little connection to 
the real world. Over several years, I have closely examined how 
constitutional drafters, courts, and legal counsel across a variety of 
constitutional systems engage with comparative materials, and identified 
the reasons they give for comparative constitutional argumentation. What 
emerges is what I term the dialogical model of comparative constitutional 
6
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reasoning.12 The starting point is that a claim to constitutional 
distinctiveness of the kind that Balkin would make is inherently relative; a 
constitutional text and its interpretation are only unique by comparison 
with other constitutions and interpretations. Since difference is defined in 
comparative terms, a keener awareness and a better understanding of 
difference can be achieved through a process of comparison. If we engage 
comparatively and ask why a foreign constitution has been drafted and 
interpreted in a certain way, this better enables us to ask ourselves why we 
reason the way we do. Comparative materials are interpretive foils, tools 
for constitutional self-reflection that help to identify what is special or 
distinctive about a constitutional order.13 
When engaging in the comparative exercise, constitutional actors may 
conclude that domestic and foreign assumptions are sufficiently similar to 
one another to warrant following a foreign constitutional example. 
Constitutional actors follow that example not because they are bound by 
it, but because they are persuaded by it, in part because it coheres with 
national constitutional assumptions. This is easiest where the point of law 
is novel, and there is no countervailing precedent. But where a precedent 
exists, comparative materials can provide the argumentative resources for 
overturning the existing law as mistaken, because it betrays existing 
national constitutional assumptions. Conversely, constitutional actors may 
conclude that comparative materials emerged from a fundamentally 
different constitutional order. A keener awareness and a better 
understanding of difference can be achieved through a process of 
comparison. A constitution can be constructed not only by reference to 
what it is, but also in relation to what it is not. 
III. TWO INDIAN EXAMPLES OF THE DIALOGICAL MODEL 
I think the dialogical model holds out some promise for marrying 
comparative engagement to the claims for national constitutional 
distinctiveness that Balkin champions in living originalism. To illustrate 
this potential, I want to consider two Indian examples of the dialogical 
model in action: one where comparative materials identified evils to be 
 
12. See Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 835 (1999); Sujit Choudhry, The 
Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT‟L J. CONST. L. 1, 52 (2004); Sujit Choudhry, 
Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 22 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006) [hereinafter Choudhry, Migration as a New 
Metaphor]; Sujit Choudhry, How To Do Comparative Constitutional Law in India: Naz Foundation, 
Same Sex Rights, and Dialogical Interpretation, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SOUTH 
ASIA 45 (Sunil Khilnani, Vikram Raghavan & Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2012) [hereinafter 
Choudhry, How To Do]. 
13. See Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor, supra note 12, at 23. 
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avoided in a manner that furthered the basic goal of the Indian 
constitutional project, and another where comparative materials were used 
by a court to identify, reframe, and enforce the premises of the Indian 
Constitution that were articulated at its adoption. 
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution provides that “No person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law.”14 An important question that faced the Indian courts 
early on was the type of procedural protection afforded by this provision. 
The issue arose in A.K. Gopalan v. Madras,15 which arose out of the 
preventative detention of the leader of the Communist Part of India a 
month after the Indian Constitution came into force in 1950. The relevant 
legislation authorized preventative detention on the basis of an executive 
order. The detained individual possessed no procedural rights that would 
normally attach to a decision to imprison an individual, such as clear 
advance notice of the prohibited conduct, notice of the grounds for 
detention, a right to a decision by an impartial decision-maker, and the 
rights to a hearing and to adduce evidence. 
At the heart of the case was a choice between two interpretive options. 
One was that the provision accorded individuals a constitutional right to 
due process for deprivations of life or liberty, parallel to the kind of 
protection afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Indeed, the 
petitioner argued that the American due process clauses were 
constitutional models that the interpretation of Article 21 should follow. 
The other interpretive option was that the procedure to which individuals 
were entitled was the one the legislature chose—including a grossly 
unfair procedure, or none at all. 
The Court rejected the first position and followed the second. It offered 
a range of reasons for firmly declining the invitation to shape the 
interpretation of Article 21 on the basis of the American experience. A 
number of these were textual. Thus, Article 21 protects different interests 
than the due process clauses—protecting “personal liberty” as opposed to 
the “liberty,” and omitting property entirely.16 Moreover, the protection 
accorded to the enumerated interests was different—a procedure 
“established” by law (which the Court took to set no constitutional 
baseline of fair procedure) opposed to one that was “due” (which the 
Court took to mean a constitutional guarantee of a minimally fair 
procedure).17 
But this choice was not just driven by the plain meaning of the text. 
 
14. INDIA CONST. art. 21. 
15. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) 1 S.C.R. 88 (India). 
16. Id. at 109. 
17. Id. at 113. 
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Rather, the Court discussed and criticized the American experience with 
substantive due process. Indeed the Court adopted a particular view of 
what substantive due process stood for—the constitutionalization of 
judicial policy preferences. As the Court put it, the phrase “means 
reasonable law according to the view of the majority of the judges of the 
Supreme Court at a particular time holding office.”18 This was the true 
mischief the Court sought to avoid, by closing the door to even procedural 
due process out of the fear that it might later morph into a substantive 
form of review. 
Moreover, the Court nodded toward the drafting history of Article 21, 
although it did not discuss it in detail. This history is well known to 
students of Indian constitutionalism. The precursor to Article 21 tracked 
the wording of the American due process clauses exactly. Over the course 
of the drafting process, it was amended in stages: property was removed; 
“personal” was inserted to qualify “liberty”; and, finally, due process was 
replaced with a “procedure established by law.” Throughout the drafting 
of Article 21, the American constitutional experience mattered centrally. 
But it operated not as a model to be followed, but as a danger to be 
avoided at all costs.19 There were two specific dangers that the framers of 
the Indian Constitution sought to avoid by rejecting the wording of the 
due process clauses. The first was the concern that the clause would 
provide an open-ended tool for the courts to second-guess legislative 
policy judgments, anticipating the views later voiced by the Supreme 
Court of India in Gopalan.20 The second danger was narrower—the risk 
that the provision would be used to challenge regulatory and redistributive 
legislation in the name of economic libertarianism. B.N. Rau, the 
Constitutional Advisor to the Constituent Assembly, raised the fear that a 
due process clause could “stand in the way of beneficent social 
legislation.”21 Rau invoked Lochner-era libertarianism as a risk against 
which to inoculate the Indian Constitution. Indeed, Rau‟s views were 
based in part on the advice of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter, 
drawing on the New Deal crisis.22 The memories of these constitutional 
battles were still fresh, and had already become part of the emerging 
global constitutional consciousness. 
The construction of America as the constitutional other was an element 
of a larger constitutional narrative on the very point and purpose of the 
Indian constitutional project. It is sometimes said that the Indian 
 
18. Id. at 110. 
19. Id. at 111. 
20. GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 102 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1999) (1966). 
21. Id. at 87. 
22. Id. at 103-04. 
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Constitution institutionalized a national and a social revolution. The 
national revolution was the establishment of the institutions and 
procedures of democratic self-government for a newly empowered 
democratic majority, including federalism and parliamentary democracy. 
In this sense, the Indian Constitution is a decidedly postcolonial 
constitutional text, akin to the American Constitution. But it is also a 
charter for the transformation of a deeply hierarchical and unequal 
society. Long before the British colonial experience, political, economic, 
and social power had been held in the hands of the very few, with 
inequalities structured along the intersecting grounds of caste, religion, 
ethnicity, and income. One of the basic objectives of the Indian 
independence movement was to harness the state to redress centuries of 
neglect, exploitation, and discrimination experienced by the Indian 
masses at the hands of the powerful. These two constitutional agendas 
were interconnected. A democratic and independent India—the national 
revolution—was the prerequisite to the social revolution, since it would 
put political power into the hands of the oppressed. 
As Granville Austin has argued, the social revolution gave rise to two 
interrelated sets of constitutional provisions, Parts III and IV of the Indian 
Constitution.23 Part III, entitled “Fundamental Rights,” entrenches the 
standard schedule of negative rights found in most liberal democratic 
constitutions (including Article 21). One of the main motivations 
underlying the entrenchment of these rights was to protect already 
disadvantaged minorities from further oppression at the hands of newly 
empowered democratic majorities. This danger was particularly acute 
within provinces, because federalism created the potential for subnational 
tyrannies. Part III is expressly subject to judicial enforcement.24 Part IV 
comprises the Directive Principles of State Policy, and is a schedule of 
positive duties. They set a blueprint for a redistributive and regulatory 
state of precisely the kind that the Lochner court treated with 
constitutional suspicion, by mandating the Indian state to play a central 
role in the emancipation of the Indian masses. For example, Article 43 
obliges the state to set labor standards, including a living wage.25 
The juridical character of Part IV and its interrelationship with Part III 
were important issues during the Indian constitutional deliberations, and 
reflected the lessons drawn from the Lochner era and the New Deal crisis. 
One of the design questions faced by the Indian framers was the 
justiciability of Part IV. Some argued that Part IV ought to entrench a set 
of judicially enforceable positive rights, because they were no less 
 
23. Id. at 50. 
24. INDIA CONST. art. 32. 
25. Id. art. 43. 
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important than the negative rights in Part III, whose justiciability was not 
a point in dispute. However, this position was ultimately rejected.26 Part 
IV is expressly non-justiciable,27 out of a fear of equipping the courts with 
the tools to wade into the details of socioeconomic policy, as the Lochner 
court had done. Rather, they were envisioned as constitutional reminders 
that could be deployed in political discourse as standards of political 
accountability, and to channel democratic politics to focus on such 
questions.28 
This drafting choice led to another set of design issues. During the 
Constituent Assembly debates, the concern was raised that the 
Fundamental Rights set out in Part III could be used to challenge policies 
enacted to implement the Directive Principles of State Policy entrenched 
by Part IV. The Lochner era furnished both concrete examples of public 
policies and the doctrinal arguments (especially substantive due process) 
that fueled these fears. One proposal was to immunize laws enacted 
pursuant to Part IV from challenge under Part III.29 However, this was 
regarded as creating too large an exception to the scope of Part III, since 
the Directive Principles were broadly worded enough to conceivably 
anchor much, if not most, socioeconomic legislation. Instead, the framers 
adopted a different strategy—to draft the rights in Part III in such a way 
as to reduce their potential to serve as swords, to prevent them from 
acting as roadblocks to transformative public policies, like Article 21.30 
The debates over the drafting of the Indian Constitution were incredibly 
rich. They were very much rooted in the politics of the Indian 
independence movement, in which the members of the Indian Constituent 
Assembly had been central participants. The basic question was what kind 
of nation India should become, which these debates answered by 
reference to India‟s recent past and hoped-for future. Comparative 
reasoning—such as the invocation of the American experience with 
substantive due process—did not dilute the fundamentally Indian 
character of these debates, or the idea that the Indian Constitution should 
reflect a view of the nature of the Indian political identity. Rather, 
comparative materials facilitated and enabled domestic constitutional 
choice, by clarifying the worrying implications of certain textual options 
for the success of the Indian constitutional project. In the case of Article 
 
26. AUSTIN, supra note 20, at 77-79. 
27. INDIA CONST. art. 37. 
28. AUSTIN, supra note 20, at 76-79. 
29. Id. at 77-78 (“It is thus a matter for careful consideration, he [Rau] continued, whether „the 
Constitution might not expressly provide that no law made and no action taken by the state in the 
discharge of its duties under Chapter III of Part III (the Directive Principles) shall be invalid merely 
by reason of its contravening the provisions of Chapter II (the Fundamental Rights).‟”). 
30. Id. at 78-79. 
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21, it was a source of lessons to be learned and dangers to be avoided. 
This reasoning was carried forward to the subsequent interpretation of 
Article 21 in Gopalan. The Court‟s framework for analysis was an 
originalism that was comparatively informed. Moreover, it was a living 
originalism in the following sense. The goal of social revolution was one 
that the Indian state would have to achieve over time. The precise policies 
through which to achieve that goal would necessarily shift with changing 
circumstances. The fear of Lochnering the Indian Constitution—by 
interpreting it as an obstacle to the regulatory, redistributive state—was 
framed at a sufficiently high level of abstraction that it could be employed 
as an interpretive trope to defend an evolving arsenal of public policies. 
The second example of the dialogical model in action is a recent 
decision of the Delhi High Court on the constitutionality of section 377 of 
the Indian Penal Code, which criminalizes same-sex sexual activity: the 
Naz Foundation case.31 The constitutional challenge was brought by a 
human rights organization, divorced from an actual proceeding. The Court 
found the provision unconstitutional in its application to consensual 
sexual acts of adults in private, on the basis of the Indian equality clause 
(Article 14) and Article 21. Comparative constitutional law played a 
central role in the case, and illustrates another way in which a living 
originalism can be comparatively inflected. 
The background to Naz Foundation is that in a growing number of 
constitutional systems, courts have condemned discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, and interpreted constitutional guarantees of liberty 
and/or privacy in a non-discriminatory manner to encompass sexual 
intimacy between same-sex partners. These comparative materials were at 
the center of the legal submissions to the court in Naz Foundation, which 
should be understood as part of a global legal-political strategy to advance 
the cause of same-sex rights through public interest litigation. The 
methodological question was the relevance of these materials to the 
interpretation of the Indian Constitution. This was a point of cleavage 
among the parties challenging and defending the provision. The argument 
against the role of comparative constitutional law offered by the Union of 
India (it has since dropped its opposition to the challenge to section 377) 
sounded in a nationalist register. It entailed the following claims: (a) the 
Constitution should be interpreted to be consistent with Indian cultural 
norms; (b) when interpreting the fundamental rights provisions of the 
Constitution, courts should prefer interpretations that are consistent with 
Indian cultural norms and reject interpretations that are inconsistent with 
them; (c) when determining whether violations of rights are justifiable, 
 
31. Naz Found. v. Gov‟t of NCT of Delhi & Others, (2009) WP(C) No.7455/2001, July 2, 2009 
(Del. H.C.). For a more detailed analysis of the case, see Choudhry, How To Do, supra note 12. 
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courts should defer when legislation reflects Indian cultural norms; and 
(d) comparative materials are an irrelevant and illegitimate aid to 
constitutional interpretation, since by definition they come from outside 
the Indian cultural context.32 
In Naz Foundation, the asserted cultural norm was the disapproval of 
homosexuality.33 Within the nationalist framework, the rejection of 
comparative constitutional law therefore meant the following: (a) the 
Constitution should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the 
rejection of homosexuality; (b) the right to privacy should not be 
interpreted as protecting the right to sexual intimacy among homosexuals, 
and the right to equality should not be interpreted as prohibiting 
distinctions drawn on the basis of sexual orientation because that would 
be inconsistent with Indian cultural norms that disapprove of 
homosexuality; (c) if those rights have been violated, the court should 
defer because section 377 reflects an Indian cultural norm that 
disapproves of homosexuality; and (d) comparative jurisprudence which 
holds to the contrary on one or more of these points is irrelevant. 
The parties that challenged section 377 failed to provide an extended 
defense for the use of comparative materials. But the best answer is 
provided by constitutional cosmopolitanism, and consists of the following 
propositions: (a) the Constitution should be interpreted to be consistent 
with the principles of liberal political morality; (b) Article 21 should be 
interpreted as protecting the right to privacy, which in turn entails the 
right to sexual intimacy—homosexual and heterosexual—and Articles 14 
and 15 should be interpreted as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation; (c) even if section 377 reflects an Indian cultural norm 
that disapproves of homosexuality, courts should not defer to section 377 
simply because it reflects Indian cultural norms; and (d) the court should 
cite and apply comparative materials that stand for one or more of these 
propositions as if they were law. 
Much of the judgment in Naz Foundation fits this account. 
Comparative constitutional law was a central feature of the judgment, and 
figured prominently at nearly every stage of the court‟s analysis. First, the 
court cited comparative case law from the United States, the European 
Court of Human Rights, South Africa, Fiji, and Nepal—all of which 
interpreted the right to privacy as encompassing the right to intimate 
sexual relations—in support of its holding that Article 21 encompasses 
the right to engage in such conduct, and was, therefore, violated by the 
challenged provision. 34 This issue attracted the most serious and sustained 
 
32. See Naz Found., (2009) WP(C) No. 7455/2001, at para. 24. 
33. Id. at para. 12. 
34. Id. at para. 58. 
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engagement with comparative materials.35 Second, the court relied on 
comparative case law from Canada and South Africa to define the content 
of the right to dignity, also protected by Article 21, which the court held 
was violated as well.36 Third, the Court turned to the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
to hold that a facially neutral ban on “unnatural sex” without reference to 
sexual orientation in fact deliberately targeted homosexuals as a class, 
because the prohibited sexual acts were closely associated with 
homosexuality.37 Fourth, the Court looked to decisions from the European 
Court of Human Rights and the United States Supreme Court to hold that 
popular disapproval of homosexuality on the ground of morality, no 
matter how widespread, is not a legitimate reason to limit constitutionally 
protected rights.38 
However, this reading of Naz Foundation cannot explain one of the 
most striking features of the judgment—its invocation of the ideals 
animating the adoption of the Indian Constitution, as described by 
scholars and reflected in the writings and speeches of its most important 
framers. For example, at the end of its treatment of Article 21, the Court 
noted that the “fundamental rights had their roots deep in the struggle for 
independence” and referred to Granville Austin‟s explanation that “they 
were included in the Constitution in the hope and expectation that one day 
the tree of true liberty would bloom in India.”39 In a parallel fashion, after 
the Court concluded that public morality could not justify the limitation of 
rights, the Court referred to Austin‟s argument that one of the basic 
purposes of the Indian Constitution was to achieve or foster a “social 
revolution.”
40
 The court defined this revolution as the creation “of a 
society egalitarian to the extent that all citizens were to be equally free 
from coercion or restriction by the state, or by society privately.”41 
Finally, at the end of its reasons, after it had addressed all the 
constitutional issues—including the appropriate remedy—the Court 
invoked Nehru and his speech on the Objective Resolution in the 
Constituent Assembly to argue that one of the underlying themes in the 
Indian Constitution is “inclusiveness.” The Court continued: 
This Court believes that [the] Indian Constitution reflects this 
value deeply ingrained in Indian society, nurtured over several 
generations. The inclusiveness that Indian society traditionally 
 
35. Id. at paras. 53-64. 
36. Id. at paras. 25-28, 41-47. 
37. Id. at paras. 94-98. 
38. Id. at paras. 75-87. 
39. Id. at para. 52. 
40. Id. at para. 80. 
41. Id. 
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displayed, literally in every aspect of life, is manifest in 
recognising a role in society for everyone. Those perceived by the 
majority as “deviants” or “different” are not on that score 
excluded or ostracised. 
Where society can display inclusiveness and understanding, such 
persons can be assured of a life of dignity and non-discrimination. 
This was the “spirit behind the Resolution” of which Nehru spoke 
so passionately.42 
This material on the point and purpose of the Indian Constitution is a 
world away from the constitutional cosmopolitanism that sets the 
character and tone of the rest of the judgment. The judgment, in a very 
basic sense, speaks in two voices: a global voice that draws heavily on 
constitutional jurisprudence from abroad, and an Indian nationalist voice 
that gives pride of place to the political project underlying the adoption of 
the Indian Constitution. In addition to failing to justify its use of 
comparative constitutional law, the Court also fails to provide any 
explanation for how the externally and internally driven parts of its 
reasons are connected. 
A careful examination of the hearing transcript43 and the judgment 
shows that the missing link between the comparative jurisprudence on 
same-sex rights and the basic premises of the Indian Constitution is the 
analogy between sexual orientation and untouchability.44 The Indian 
Constitution singles out untouchability for special and selective 
condemnation in Article 17. Article 17 provides in full: “„Untouchability‟ 
is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of 
any disability arising out of „Untouchability‟ shall be an offense 
punishable in accordance with law.”45 Alongside Articles 15(2), 23, and 
24, Article 17 applies to private actors, in contrast to the other provisions 
of Part III (“Fundamental Rights),” which apply to government and direct 
it to act or refrain from acting in certain ways. Article 17 purports to 
abolish a social status, and the social practices that revolve around that 
status, which exist apart from and independent of state action.46 In other 
words, Article 17 applies horizontally. Moreover, it goes much further, 
and mandates that the private breach of this constitutional duty must be 
punishable by criminal sanction. 
Article 17 reflects the view, as Gopal Guru puts it, that “dignity may 
not easily come forth from the upper castes; it will have to be forcibly 
 
42. Id. at paras. 130-31. 
43. Edited Transcript of the Final Arguments Before the Delhi High Court, in THE RIGHT THAT 
DARES TO SPEAK ITS NAME 48 (Arvind Narrain & Marcus Eldridge eds., 2009). 
44. Id. at 54. 
45. INDIA CONST. art. 17. 
46. MADHAV KHOSLA, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 88-90 (2012). 
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extracted from the recalcitrant members of twice-born civil society.”47 
The whole constitutional architecture of reservations for Scheduled Castes 
found in Articles 15(4), 16(4), 29(2), 330, and 332—which aim to 
fundamentally redistribute economic, political, and social power toward 
the Scheduled Castes—is designed to compensate for millennia of neglect 
and exploitation. As Guru explains, the nationalist movement was not just 
about the advocacy of self-government to oppose “the colonial 
configuration of power,” but also about the promotion of social justice to 
challenge “local configurations of power.”48 Indeed, it was “one of the 
central organizing and mobilizing principles of the nationalist 
movement.”49 
What analogy did the Court see between untouchability and sexual 
orientation? Unfortunately, the Court does not say. But perhaps the 
argument is this. Naz Foundation held that the effect of section 377 was 
to create a status offense—to “be classed as criminal as such.”50 Since 
section 377 criminalizes “these sexual acts which . . . are associated more 
closely with one class of persons, namely, the homosexuals[,] Section 377 
. . . has the effect of viewing all gay men as criminals.”51 Section 377 
effectively brands homosexuals as outlaws who do not enjoy the law‟s 
protection. The Court described the effects of this status offense: 
Even when the penal provisions are not enforced, they reduce gay 
men or women to what one author has referred to as 
“unapprehended felons,” thus entrenching stigma and encouraging 
discrimination in different spheres of life. Apart from misery and 
fear, a few of the more obvious consequences are harassment, 
blackmail, extortion and discrimination. There is extensive 
material placed on the record in the form of affidavits, 
authoritative reports by well known agencies and judgments that 
testify to a widespread use of Section 377 IPC to brutalise [the] 
MSM [men who have sex with men] and gay community.52 
But what is the link between sexual orientation and untouchability? The 
treatment which homosexuals experience today is similar in kind to that 
which “untouchables” experienced and which prompted the adoption of 
 
47. Gopal Guru, Constitutional Justice: Positional and Cultural, in POLITICS AND ETHICS OF THE 
INDIAN CONSTITUTION 230, 235 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 2008). 
48. Id. at 232. 
49. Id. (citing K.M. PANNIKAR, IN DEFENCE OF LIBERALISM 15 (1962); Rajeev Bhargava, 
Democratic Vision of a New Republic: India, 1950, in TRANSFORMING INDIA 26 (Francine Frankel, 
Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava & Balveer Arora eds., 2000)). 
50. Naz Found. v. Gov‟t of NCT of Delhi & Others, (2009) WP(C) N.7455/2001, July 2, 2009 
(Del. H.C.), at para. 50 (citing Jawaharlal Nehru, Speech Commenting on the Criminal Tribes Act 
(1936)). 
51. Id. at para. 94. 
52. Id. at para. 50. 
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Article 17, in that the treatment of homosexuals likewise flows from their 
social status. As was noted during the Constituent Assembly Debates, the 
purpose of Article 17 was “to save one-sixth of the Indian population 
from perpetual subjugation and despair, from perpetual humiliation and 
disgrace.”53 This manifest injustice was delivered not by the hands of the 
state, but “by a vast mass of Hindu population which is hostile to them 
and which is not ashamed of committing any inequity or atrocity against 
them.”54 
The comparative jurisprudence on the criminal prohibition of anal 
intercourse was not simply applied, as constitutional cosmopolitanism 
would suggest. The picture is more complex. Comparative materials led 
the Court to revisit and update the premises of the Indian Constitution. 
The engine of this change is the analogy between untouchability and 
sexual orientation. The Court may have reasoned that the two were indeed 
analogous, and accordingly that the Indian Constitution should condemn 
discrimination on the latter basis as much as on the former. The doctrinal 
implications of this reading of Naz Foundation remain to be worked out. 
Naz Foundation could stand for the proposition that there is a 
constitutional doctrine that grows out of Article 17, whereby groups who 
experience disadvantage analogous to that experienced by “untouchables” 
are entitled to the highest degree of constitutional protection. This 
disadvantage occurs along every dimension—social, economic, and 
political—and is mutually reinforcing. With respect to such groups, for 
example, this doctrine might counsel a particularly stringent approach to 
equality claims brought under Articles 14 and 15 that does not shy away 
from the prohibition of indirect discrimination, which is often proof of 
legislative animus toward the most disadvantaged. It could render 
inadmissible public morality as the justification for the infringement of 
constitutional rights of such groups, because public morality is 
particularly likely to reflect a naked preference to harm those groups. 
Finally, it may mean that the interpretation of other fundamental rights is 
infused with equality, so that a court is particularly alert to the importance 
of the interests protected by those rights to the group in question, and 
ensures that the scope of the right is defined accordingly. For example, 
against the backdrop of pervasive cultural disapproval of homosexuality, 
this doctrine provides an additional reason for including sexual intimacy 
within the right to privacy under Article 21, which, of course, is the main 
 
53. Choundhry, How To Do, supra note 12, at 80 (quoting Voices Against 377, Note on the 
Constituent Assembly Debates and Equality, supplemental submission in Naz Found. v. Gov‟t of NCT 
of Delhi and Others, (2009) WP(C) No.7455/2001, July 2, 2009 (Del. H.C.)). 
54. Id. 
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holding in Naz Foundation.55 
This mode of comparative constitutional reasoning is dialogical. 
External legal sources were used as foils to constitutional self-reflection, 
and nourished and reframed the judges‟ reading of internal constitutional 
sources. Naz Foundation illustrates the role of argument by analogy—in 
this case, the idea that a constitutional system may single out social 
groups who have experienced severe disadvantage for the highest degree 
of constitutional protection, and that comparative materials may serve to 
highlight that other social groups experience analogous forms and levels 
of disadvantage that warrant a comparable constitutional response. The 
question was whether comparative constitutional law resonated with pre-
existing Indian constitutional premises; Naz Foundation held that it did. 
The Indian constitutional experience illustrates a comparative, engaged 
living originalism in practice. It demonstrates that to engage 
comparatively does not necessarily entail a commitment to a project of 
constitutional convergence on a shared liberal democratic model, as 
constitutional cosmopolitans claim it must, and as nationalists fear. The 
dialogical model—as exemplified by Gopalan and Naz Foundation—
provides a framework for engagement with comparative materials in a 
way that not only acknowledges, but also affirms, a distinct constitutional 
identity. It does so either by sharpening moments of constitutional 
difference (Gopalan) or by highlighting a shared (and arguably 
contingent) overlap of shared constitutional premises (Naz Foundation). 
The identity-affirming possibilities of comparative engagement have often 
been overlooked in the recent literature on comparative constitutional law, 
but are a common feature of constitutional argument across many 
jurisdictions. The globalization of the practice of modern 
constitutionalism is not necessarily in tension with a genuine commitment 
to “our constitution” as the overarching framework within which 
constitutional discourse occurs. 
 
55. Readers will notice that Indian constitutional doctrine shifted sharply in direction between 
Gopalan and Naz Foundation on the question of substantive due process. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union 
of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597, the Supreme Court rejected Gopalan and announced the existence of 
the doctrine of substantive due process under Article 21. Until Naz Foundation, the principal target of 
the doctrine of substantive due process had been executive action. Naz Foundation, along with the 
Supreme Court‟s recent decision in Selvi v. Karnataka, A.I.R. 2010 S.C. 1974, may mark the 
beginning of the application of substantive due process to legislation. Moreover, Naz Foundation 
reformulated that doctrine, elevating the standard of review set out in Maneka Gandhi—that a 
violation of an Article 21 right not be “arbitrary”—to a requirement that the state demonstrate that it 
has a “compelling state interest” for infringing the right, a much more stringent standard. If the 
Supreme Court of India affirms Naz Foundation on appeal, it must offer a coherent framework that 
reconciles the interpretation of Article 21 with Part IV, and remains faithful to the basic relationship 
between Parts III and IV worked out during the framing of the Indian Constitution. For example, it 
may: (a) reaffirm that contract and property lie outside the scope of the provision; and (b) mandate 
deference to state action that purports to implement Part IV. 
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CONCLUSION: RETHINKING LAWRENCE 
Let me conclude by reflecting on the dialogical model of comparative 
constitutional law for living originalism in the United States. Scholars of 
comparative constitutional law can sometimes be evangelical when 
proselytizing the benefits of comparative engagement to domestic 
constitutional analysis. To be clear, I do not hold this view. I do not stake 
the claim that for a constitutional actor to be worldly and sophisticated, 
comparative analysis is a necessity—and conversely, that the absence of 
comparative engagement is symptomatic of a narrow-minded and dated 
parochialism. Living originalism can regard comparative materials as 
irrelevant, and would not be deficient for doing so. But it is possible for a 
living originalist to harness them. Balkin says that when the American 
people engage in constitutional construction, they appeal to “the 
principles we committed ourselves to achieving and the evils we promised 
we would not permit again.”56 The Indian experience illustrates how this 
kind of internally oriented constitutional conversation can nonetheless be 
enriched through comparative materials. 
Here is how. One of the most powerful argumentative tropes in Living 
Originalism is analogy. For example, Balkin underlines how the woman 
suffragists drew parallels between the denial of their right to vote and the 
plight of the colonists who complained about taxation without 
representation.57 Arguments by analogy highlight an underlying principle 
that unites two examples. This is a form of living originalism, because 
new social movements and social claims invoke historical examples of 
groups whose constitutional claims have been accepted in the past, and 
attempt to establish a continuity with them in the present. 
Analogies from foreign constitutional systems can function in the same 
way—to help identify principles that Americans have already committed 
themselves to. The Naz Foundation case illustrates how this can be done 
with respect to novel legal questions. But foreign analogies can also be 
more disruptive, because they can highlight how precedents are unfaithful 
to national constitutional premises, and can provide the interpretive 
resources to overturn them. Consider a potential application of a 
comparatively inflected living originalism in Lawrence. Lawrence 
provoked a heated debate over its constitutional comparativism, both on 
and off the Court. Justice Kennedy‟s majority judgment cites decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights to illustrate “that the reasoning and 
holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere.”58 Although it is 
 
56. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 63. 
57. Id. at 84. 
58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003). 
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possible to read Lawrence‟s citation of European jurisprudence narrowly 
as a refutation of Bowers‟ claim that the prohibition of sodomy was 
universal in Western civilization, the better view is that the majority was 
engaged in an under-theorized form of cosmopolitan interpretation, which 
viewed Lawrence as part of a growing transnational discussion over 
same-sex rights, in which the American constitutional position had 
become increasingly anomalous. Justice Scalia‟s dissent sounded in 
nationalism, accusing the majority‟s references to European case law as 
“meaningless dicta” and “dangerous dicta” because “foreign views” were 
not relevant to the interpretation of the American Constitution.59 
Balkin discusses Lawrence, but does not address its comparative 
engagement and the controversy surrounding it. Rather, he offers a series 
of ways to justify the decision that are applications of living originalism 
and are oriented inward toward the American constitutional tradition. One 
is the anti-caste theory of the Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits 
legislation that subordinates a social group, either by its intent or its 
effect, and creates second-class citizens.60 The anti-caste principle 
emerges from a reading of the basic point of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and is anchored in the fight for racial equality.61 In its fullest form, it 
comprehends the interdependent nature of discrimination at the hands of 
the state in a particular law, and a broader system of systemic 
disadvantage that cuts across the political, economic, and social spheres. 
The mediating mechanism between official discrimination at the hands of 
the state and a caste-like status is the social meaning created by legislative 
classifications. This meaning undergirds social norms that legitimize 
widespread discrimination across a broad range of interactions with public 
and private actors. 
Over time, the Supreme Court has extended the reach of the anti-caste 
doctrine to protect other groups, including gays and lesbians in Romer v. 
Evans.62 However, Romer focused narrowly on the issue of legislative 
animus,63 and did not address the broader system of social meanings and 
subordination of which the challenged law was a part.64 Justice 
O‟Connor‟s concurrence in Lawrence moved further toward the full 
realization of the anti-caste doctrine in the area of same-sex rights, but 
 
59. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court‟s discussion of these foreign views (ignoring, of 
course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is therefore 
meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since „this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, 
fads, or fashions on Americans.‟”) (citation omitted). 
60. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 235-36. 
61. See Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). 
62. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
63. Id. at 632. 
64. Id. at 630. 
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stopped short. She emphasized the issue of legislative animus and the 
collateral legal consequences of a conviction under the anti-sodomy law 
for a variety of areas like employment. But she only mentioned in passing 
the ways in which the mere existence of such laws create broader social 
meanings that subordinate gays and lesbians, and did not attach any 
constitutional significance to those broader social meanings and their 
concrete consequences.65 Moreover, neither Romer nor Lawrence sought 
to draw analogies between orientation-based discrimination and race-
based discrimination in order to shape the scope of the anti-caste doctrine 
and apply it in those cases. 
Unlike Justice Kennedy‟s, Justice O‟Connor‟s opinion did not engage 
with comparative materials. But her application of the anti-caste doctrine 
could have been strengthened by engaging with foreign decisions that 
have conceptualized the harm of anti-sodomy laws in terms of equality. 
These decisions highlight that the mere existence of such laws—even 
if unenforced—fuel harassment, violence, and prejudice by private 
actors against gays and lesbians. They do so by creating a status offense 
that renders gays and lesbians outsiders to the law, and which have 
analogized the effects of such laws to those that discriminate on the basis 
of race. Indeed, a comparative example was readily at hand. Five years 
prior to Lawrence, the South African Constitutional Court explained that 
the effect of an anti-sodomy law was to “legitimate or encourage 
blackmail, police entrapment, violence („queer-bashing‟) and peripheral 
discrimination, such as the refusal of facilities, accommodation and 
opportunities.”66 Moreover, the South African Constitutional Court drew a 
powerful analogy between the consequences of an anti-sodomy law and 
the consequences of laws that criminalized interracial sexual relations 
under apartheid. Thus, it explained that “[j]ust as apartheid legislation 
rendered the lives of couples of different racial groups perpetually at risk, 
the sodomy offense builds insecurity and vulnerability into the daily lives 
of gay men.”67 In short, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
was analogous to discrimination on the basis of race. Since the prohibition 
on racial discrimination is one of the core commitments of the South 
African constitutional order, this analogy highlighted the incompatibility 
between anti-sodomy laws and the basic premises of the South African 
 
65. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O‟Connor, J., concurring) (“When a State 
makes homosexual conduct criminal, and not „deviate sexual intercourse‟ committed by persons of 
different sexes, „that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.‟” (citation omitted)). 
66. Nat‟l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. & Another v. Minister of Justice & Others, 1999 (1) 
SA 6 (CC) at para. 24 (quoting Edwin Cameron, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case 
for Human Rights, 110 S. AFR. L.J. 450, 456 (1993)). 
67. Id. at para. 28. 
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constitutional project. 
In applying the anti-caste doctrine, Justice O‟Connor could have 
engaged with the reasoning of the South African Court, and made a 
parallel line of argument. She could have described the broader negative 
consequences that flow from the mere existence of anti-sodomy laws and 
the social meaning they create, explaining how they create a status 
offense. She could have then analogized these consequences to the harms 
created by the miscegenation laws that Loving v. Virginia held were 
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment because they were a form of 
racial discrimination.68 In short, Lawrence presented a missed opportunity 
for the Court to make a link to Loving and to draw an analogy between 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and race—a possibility 
that was highlighted by comparative jurisprudence from South Africa. If it 
has been used in this way, comparative constitutional law would not have 
functioned as evidence of a growing consensus across constitutional 
systems toward which the United States should converge. Rather, it would 
have served as an interpretive foil to enable an American court to 
apprehend and frame an argument for the unconstitutionality of anti-
sodomy laws that was firmly rooted in the most central parts of the 
American constitutional tradition. 
What would Balkin say to this analysis? Balkin defends Lawrence on 
the basis of the anti-caste principle and traces the origin of the principle to 
the struggle against racial subordination. But he does not set out all the 
doctrinal implications of this principle, nor their detailed application to 
anti-sodomy laws. The South African Constitutional Court‟s analysis 
would have assisted him in doing so, in the service of American 
constitutional principle. This is precisely the kind of comparatively 








68. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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